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ABSTRACT—Many members of tribal nations hold assets in pension plans 
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 
When a tribal member with such a plan divorces, the plan must be divided 
between the former spouses according to a marital-asset division order 
issued pursuant to state law. A 2011 Department of Labor Advisory 
Opinion opined that this order must be issued either by a state court or a 
tribal court in a state that recognizes such orders as state law. This Note 
argues that this Advisory Opinion is flawed. ERISA simply requires an 
application of a specific body of law; it says nothing restricting the forum 
to state courts. Many tribal judiciaries have available to them choice of law 
statutes, and the martial-asset division orders they issue pursuant to state 
law should be honored. This is a matter of convenience for the tribal 
member and a matter of a tribe’s sovereignty to order its own internal 
domestic relations as it sees fit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Divorce is common in the United States.1 A divorcing couple must 
divide up their marital assets,2 including any pension plans.3 While divorce 
proceedings can present complex legal issues for most divorcees, the issues 
facing members of the various tribal nations of the United States are 
especially daunting; this is particularly true when either divorcee has an 
employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA),4 a federal law governing pension plans in private 
industries.5 In tribal nations, ERISA is applicable to private employers as 
well as to some public employers.6 While the law does not force an 
employer to provide a pension plan, if the employer does choose to do so, 
 
1 See National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2013). 
2 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2004). 
3 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 562–63 (Cal. 1976) (holding that pension plans 
are subject to division in divorce proceedings). 
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). 
5 Id. § 1003(a). 
6 See id. (stating that aside from certain exceptions, ERISA applies to “any employee benefit” that 
is “established or maintained” by an employer or employee organization “engaged in” or “affecting 
commerce”). 
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the plan is governed by ERISA.7 The process of dividing ERISA-governed 
pension plans is more complex for tribal members than nontribal citizens 
because ERISA administrators are instructed not to accept marital-asset 
division orders issued by tribal courts.8 Currently, tribal members must go 
to state courts for redress.9 
ERISA contemplates a judicial role in dividing pension plans upon 
divorce. Section 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) mandates that the division of the 
marital assets must be “made pursuant to a State domestic relations law.”10 
ERISA defines “State” as including “any State of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, 
Guam, Wake Island, and the Canal Zone.”11 Upon first reading, ERISA 
seems to suggest that administrators of ERISA-governed pension plans 
cannot accept a tribal court’s marital-asset division order. Indeed, in the 
absence of case law directly on this issue, a Department of Labor (DOL) 
Advisory Opinion came to this very conclusion.12 The opinion is not 
binding on courts, but until the issue is litigated and a court finds to the 
contrary, at least some (and likely all) ERISA pension plan administrators 
will follow this interpretation.13 This presents important ramifications for 
tribal members and the degree of sovereignty tribal nations enjoy. This 
Note explores these issues, arguing that the current situation, in which 
ERISA pension plan administrators are instructed not to honor domestic 
relations orders issued by tribal courts, is antithetical to a large body of 
jurisprudence dealing with the application of neutral, generally applicable 
laws to tribal nations. Furthermore, this Note argues that the plain language 
of ERISA already requires pension plan administrators to honor tribal 
courts’ marital-asset division orders, so long as the applicable tribal law has 
a choice of law provision permitting the use of state law where appropriate, 
and the tribal court applies the state law in issuing the order. 
Policy considerations concerning the sovereignty of tribal nations also 
weigh in favor of requiring ERISA administrators to honor tribal court 
division orders. The enforceability of the tribal orders is more than a matter 
 
7 See id. 
8 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Opinion Letter No. 2011-03A (Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Department of 
Labor 2011 Opinion Letter], available at 2011 WL 585771, at *3. 
9 See id. at *2 (noting that although ERISA only requires a “proper final order of any State 
authority” that “[f]ederal law . . . does not generally treat Indian tribes as States, or as agencies or 
instrumentalities of States”). This is problematic because tribal courts traditionally adjudicate the 
domestic affairs of their members. See Alicia K. Crawford, Comment, The Evolution of the 
Applicability of ERISA to Indian Tribes: We May Finally Have Congressional Intent, but It’s Still 
Flawed, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 259, 266 (2010). 
10 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 
11 Id. § 1002(10). 
12 See Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8. 
13 It is unknown to the author the number of pension plan administrators that have followed this 
Advisory Opinion. 
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of convenience for tribal members: if ERISA plan administrators cannot 
honor tribal court domestic relations orders, tribal members seeking 
marital-asset division upon divorce will be forced to go to state courts to 
divide pension plans.14 However, state courts do not have the same 
understanding of tribal history and customs as tribal courts.15 Furthermore, 
removing issues customarily decided by tribal courts to state courts 
jeopardizes the sovereignty of tribal nations and counteracts current trends 
in federal policy toward tribal nations.16 
Part I presents a brief overview of ERISA and the Pension Protection 
Act of 2006,17 which amended ERISA. Part II examines the applicability of 
federal legislation to tribal nations. In particular, it reviews the conflicting 
case law from and between the Supreme Court and circuit courts of 
appeals. Part III discusses the applicability of ERISA to tribal nations in 
light of conflicting circuit court jurisprudence and congressional intent. 
Part IV explores the ambiguity in ERISA’s § 1056 regarding whether 
pension plan administrators are permitted to honor domestic relations 
orders created by tribal courts. It reviews the DOL’s nonbinding Advisory 
Opinion on the matter and presents a contrasting plain-language argument 
that allows plan administrators to implement tribal courts’ orders. Part V 
examines the policy considerations that weigh in favor of allowing ERISA 
administrators to honor tribal court domestic relations orders. Finally, 
Part VI makes legislative and judicial recommendations to disambiguate 
the situation.  
I. BACKGROUND: ERISA AND THE 2006 AMENDMENT 
Congress passed and President Gerald Ford signed the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974.18 ERISA was enacted 
after multiple incidents in which employees were unable to collect their 
pension benefits because private employers had underfunded their pension 
plans.19 Although ERISA does not mandate that private employers provide 
 
14 See Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *2. 
15 See generally, e.g., Robert Yazzie, Navajo Peacekeeping: Technology and Traditional Indian 
Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 95 (1997) (outlining the Navajo peacemaking justice system). 
16 See DENIS BINDER ET AL., FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 242 
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (quoting Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings Cnty., 532 F.2d 
655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
17 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
18 Adam B. Garner, Note, Protecting the ERISA Whistleblower: The Reach of Section 510 of 
ERISA, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 235, 239 (2011). 
19 See We Work for the Employees, L. OFFS. ARCHIBALD J. THOMAS, III, P.A., http://www.job-
rights.com/erisa.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). See generally James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious 
Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packer Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 
49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001) (discussing how the 1963 Studebaker plant shutdown served as the 
impetus for the pension reform of the next decade culminating in ERISA). 
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pension plans, ERISA governs those pension plans that private employers 
choose to provide.20 The law sets minimum funding levels for pension 
plans21 and requires for the vesting of benefits after a certain period of 
time.22 It also creates the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to 
pay pension benefits to employees in the event their employers terminate 
their plans.23 ERISA explicitly preempts most state laws relating to pension 
plans,24 although it does exclude government plans at all levels from its 
ambit.25 
Since enactment in 1974, Congress has amended ERISA numerous 
times. Particularly relevant to tribal nations is the Pension Protection Act of 
2006.26 Generally, the Pension Protection Act requires companies to make 
higher premium payments to the PBGC when their pension plans are 
underfunded.27 Of import to tribal nations is a minor change in the 
definition of “governmental plan.”28 The amendment added language to the 
definition expressly exempting from ERISA plans “established and 
maintained by an Indian tribal government” for employees pursuing 
essential government functions.29 The significance of this amendment will 
be discussed infra in Part III. 
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL LAW TO TRIBAL NATIONS 
The legal status of tribal nations has long been somewhat amorphous.30 
Over the course of United States history, the judiciary’s formulation of the 
legal relationship between tribal nations and state and federal governments 
has undergone a substantial change. Courts over time have incrementally 
recast tribal nations as another local- or state-level jurisdiction,31 as 
opposed to a fully sovereign nation. The changing conception of the legal 
status of tribal nations complicates the inquiry into the applicability of 
federal and state law. This Part briefly examines the trajectory of the 
application of federal legislation to tribal nations. 
 
20 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2006). 
21 Id. § 1082. 
22 Id. § 1053. 
23 Id. §§ 1301–1381. 
24 Id. § 1144. 
25 Id. § 1003(b)(1); see also Crawford, supra note 9, at 263. 
26 Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 906(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1051–52 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(32)). 
27 Id. §§ 101–102, 120 Stat. at 784–809 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082–1086). 
28 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32). 
29 120 Stat. at 1051 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) 
(stating that ERISA shall not cover “governmental plan[s]”). 
30 See generally Robert W. Oliver, The Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 OR. L. REV. 193 
(1959) (discussing the evolution of the legal status of tribal nations). 
31 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (1994) (making it a crime to cross state or tribal borders when 
committing an act of domestic violence). 
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A. What Are Tribal Nations, Legally Speaking? 
From the founding of the United States, Native American tribes have 
been conceived of as unique entities. The United States Constitution gives 
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”32 The Constitution 
thereby distinguishes tribal nations from both foreign nations and American 
states. 
In 1831, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,33 the Supreme Court held that 
it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Cherokee Nation was 
neither a foreign nation nor a state.34 Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
describes the judicial power to decide cases, limiting the power to 
“Controversies . . . between two or more States[,] . . . between a State and 
Citizens of another State[,] . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”35 Absent one of these party 
alignments (or other conditions,36 omitted here, and clearly not applicable 
to tribal nations), federal courts do not have jurisdiction.37 The Court 
characterized the Cherokee Nation as a “domestic dependent nation[]” 
whose “relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.”38 It further noted that tribal nations only possess limited features 
of sovereignty, subject to the “dominion of the United States.”39 
Specifically, treaties between the United States and tribal nations set aside 
tracts of lands within U.S. territory, and sometimes within U.S. states, as 
“reservations” for Native American tribes.40 
The level of Native American sovereignty over these reservations has 
settled somewhere between the complete sovereignty of an independent 
nation and a state’s plenary power within a smaller sphere of activities.41 
Tribes manage their reservations, but their sovereignty is far from 
absolute—in fact, it is “subject to complete defeasance”42 by Congress. 
 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
33 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
34 Id. at 16–17, 30. 
35 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
36 There are other limitations to the judiciary’s power to hear cases. This excerpt is the part relevant 
to tribal nations. 
37 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
38 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
39 Id. 
40 See, e.g., NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN–WHITE RELATIONS FROM 
PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492–2000 (Peter Nabokov ed., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1999) (1978) 
(discussing the use of treaty making to remove tribal nations from lands desired by the United States). 
41 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d 1278, 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
tribal nation had power to adopt right to work ordinance). 
42 Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985). This statement 
was fairly well established at this time. Since the mid-1800s, the Court has incrementally extended 
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Thus, when Congress passes neutral, generally applicable legislation that 
does not explicitly mention its applicability in tribal nations, the judiciary 
must interpret whether and the extent to which that legislation should be 
applied within tribal territory.43 In determining whether federal legislation 
is applicable in tribal nations, the judiciary is the entity that determines the 
degree of sovereignty the tribal nation is to enjoy vis-à-vis that legislation’s 
field. So what are tribal nations, legally speaking? The answer depends on 
the context, and the most that can be said is that they are unique entities, 
subordinated at times to the will of Congress, and subject to ever-changing 
constraints according to the popular ideas of the time. 
B. Conflicting Case Law 
The Supreme Court stated in 1921 that “[i]t is thoroughly established 
that Congress has plenary authority over the Indians and all their tribal 
relations.”44 But the ability of Congress to assert such power does not imply 
Congress intends all legislation it passes to impinge upon tribal authority.45 
Currently, some confusion exists in this area of law.46 Since 1960, many 
courts have followed what is known as the Tuscarora rule,47 but lower 
courts are increasingly more likely to apply canons of statutory 
construction embodied in recent Supreme Court cases. 
1. The Tuscarora Rule and Coeur d’Alene Exceptions.—Despite its 
modest beginnings, Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian 
Nation48 exerts major influence regarding the applicability of federal 
statutes to tribal nations. Decided in 1960, its rather mundane holding—
that reservation lands held in fee simple by a tribe are not part of a 
reservation for purposes of the Federal Power Act49—belies its subsequent 
widespread application.50 In what has been characterized as “dicta”51 or 
 
federal and state power over tribal nations, such that by 1980 tribal self-government was thought to 
depend upon legislative grants. See Rice v. Rhener, 463 U.S. 713, 717–20 (1983). 
43 E.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–39 (1986). 
44 Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391–92 (1921) (citing Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 310–
16 (1911); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903)). 
45 E.g., Dion, 476 U.S. at 738 (stating that “presumably such power will be exercised only when 
circumstances arise which . . . may demand . . . that [Congress] should do so” (quoting Lone Wolf, 187 
U.S. at 566)). 
46 For a discussion of this and predictions about future jurisprudence, see Bryan H. Wildenthal, 
How the Ninth Circuit Overruled a Century of Supreme Court Indian Jurisprudence—and Has So Far 
Gotten Away with It, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 547, 586–90. 
47 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 115. The Federal Power Act provides for, among other things, federal regulation over and 
administrative coordination for the construction and maintenance of hydroelectric facilities. See 16 
U.S.C. § 797 (2012). 
50 See, e.g., Wildenthal, supra note 46, at 551 (discussing the scope of the Tuscarora rule). 
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“likely dictum,”52 the Supreme Court called it “well settled” that “a general 
statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property 
interests.”53 The Tuscarora rule broke from the traditional canons of 
statutory construction54 in expressing the presumption that a neutral, 
generally applicable law that is silent as to its applicability to tribal nations 
is to be applied to such entities. To many observers, this rule embodied a 
reversal of the existing presumption against applying silent legislation to 
tribal nations.55 Nonetheless, the Tuscarora rule was widely cited to 
support the application of federal legislation to tribal nations, even if doing 
so diminished tribal sovereignty.56 
Since Tuscarora, the circuit courts have developed three exceptions to 
the rule, generally referred to as the Coeur d’Alene exceptions. In Donovan 
v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm,57 a case about the applicability of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) to tribal nations, the Ninth 
Circuit noted three instances in which the Tuscarora presumption in favor 
of application to tribal nations may be reversed.58 The first such exception 
is when “the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely 
intramural matters.”59 While this exception may seem broad, the Ninth 
Circuit construed “purely intramural matters” fairly narrowly as 
“conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic 
relations.”60 The Ninth Circuit’s reading did not except tribal commercial 
activity.61 In a later case upholding ERISA’s preemption of a tribal pension 
plan, the same court narrowed the exception to apply “only where the 
tribe’s decision-making power is usurped.”62 Similar arguments that 
OSHA,63 the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),64 and the Fair Labor 
 
51 Kristen E. Burge, Comment, ERISA and Indian Tribes: Alternative Approaches for Respecting 
Tribal Sovereignty, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1291, 1301. 
52 Crawford, supra note 9, at 265. 
53 Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 116. 
54 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
55 See, e.g., Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of 
Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 456 (2007) (arguing that Tuscarora conflicts with canons of 
statutory interpretation). 
56 See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(noting the NLRB’s observation that Tuscarora has been applied in several contexts). 
57 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
58 Id. at 1115–16. 
59 Id. at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
63 Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996). The court found that 
congressional safety regulation of a tribally owned construction business did not impinge upon the 
tribe’s right of self-governance in purely intramural affairs because construction is a commercial, rather 
than governmental, activity. Id. at 180. 
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Standards Act (FLSA)65 fall under this exception have failed. However, the 
Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) to tribal nations because it “touches on purely internal matters 
related to the tribe’s self-governance.”66 
Second, the Tuscarora presumption does not apply when “the 
application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by 
Indian treaties.”67 Circuit courts have also narrowly construed this 
exception. The Seventh Circuit stated “[t]he critical issue is whether 
application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is secured by the 
treaty.”68 The traditional view of treaties with tribal nations considered that 
a “treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from 
them.”69 By looking to the treaty for explicit guarantees, the Seventh 
Circuit’s construction reversed the traditional view: instead of reading 
silences in the treaty to retain tribal rights for the tribe, courts examine the 
treaty for express reservations of tribal rights. The absence of such a 
reservation is interpreted to mean that the federal government has retained 
the right to regulate in that area. If the courts find expressly granted rights 
that federal law would abrogate, the legislation cannot be applied to tribal 
nations.70 
Third, the Tuscarora presumption is reversed when “there is proof by 
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] 
not to apply to Indians on their reservations.”71 In practice, it may be 
difficult to obtain such proof because legislation silent on its applicability 
to tribal nations will likely not have legislative history considering the 
issue.72 If the legislators had considered the matter, there is a good chance 
that the outcome of their deliberations, whatever their inclination, would 
find itself into the final legislation. 
In sum, the Tuscarora presumption is broad, and its exceptions are 
narrow. Once the threshold consideration—the statute’s silence with 
respect to its application to tribal nations—is met, the Tuscarora 
 
64 NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the court 
noted that the health organization was only partially funded by the tribe, and employed many 
individuals who were not tribal members, so the NLRA was applicable. Id. at 1000. 
65 Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2009). The court found that, because the tribe had not 
enacted regulation with respect to wage and hour, it had elected to forgo regulation in this area, and 
therefore federal legislation did not impinge on the tribe’s right of self-governance. Id. at 434. 
66 EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
67 Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
68 Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). 
69 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (emphasis added). 
70 See United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1974). 
71 Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72 Crawford, supra note 9, at 267. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
720 
presumption is applied. Only if a statute fits into one of three narrow 
exceptions will a court following Tuscarora find that the statute does not 
apply to tribal nations. 
2. Traditional Canons of Statutory Construction with Respect to 
Tribes.—Although numerous lower court decisions have applied 
the Tuscarora rule,73 the Supreme Court has never evaluated it. Juxtaposed 
with the Tuscarora precedents is a competing line of cases which invoke 
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning traditional canons of statutory 
construction.74 Three canons are of particular relevance to navigating the 
inquiry into whether a neutral, generally applicable statute, silent as to its 
applicability to tribes, is intended to apply to tribal nations.75 
The first traditional canon demands that if Congress intends to 
abrogate tribal sovereignty, it must clearly express this intent.76 This, in 
effect, is a presumption against the applicability of legislation to tribal 
nations unless that legislation expressly states that it is to be so applied.77 
Notably, this canon directly contradicts the Tuscarora presumption in favor 
of applicability to tribal nations. 
The second canon of construction from the Supreme Court is that any 
ambiguity in a provision of federal legislation must be interpreted in a 
manner that benefits the tribes.78 Two considerations acknowledged in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence weigh in favor of interpreting legislation this 
way. First, there is a disparity in power between the federal government 
and tribal nations.79 Application of this canon leads to reading statutes and 
provisions to have as little impact as possible on tribal nations.80 Second, 
the federal government has trust responsibilities for the tribal nations that it 
 
73 Mainly the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & 
Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that OSHA was properly applied to a tribally owned 
construction company); Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 
683, 685 (9th Cir. 1991) (determining that ERISA applied to the pension plans of employees of a 
tribally owned sawmill); Smart, 868 F.2d at 935–36 (holding that ERISA applied to a tribal employer 
and its tribal employees of a reservation health center). 
74 The Eighth and Tenth Circuits generally invoke these canons. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fond du Lac 
Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 250–51 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that ADEA does not apply 
to employment discrimination within tribal nations); Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 
709, 711–12 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding OSHA inapplicable to a tribal business in a tribal nation). 
75 See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999); San Manuel 
Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
76 Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 202; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49, 72 (1978); San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 475 F.3d at 1311. 
77 This was the prevailing rule before Tuscarora. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
78 Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 
269 (1992); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 
426 U.S. 373, 390–92 (1976); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174–76 (1973). 
79 See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174 (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)). 
80 See, e.g., Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 269 (applying the canon to hold that a tax on the 
sale of tribal land was not allowed under a county’s excise tax). 
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does not have with respect to the states.81 The exact contours of this 
responsibility have shifted over time, but generally speaking it imposes a 
fiduciary duty on the federal government.82 
The final canon of construction dictates that ambiguous legislation 
should be interpreted to further current federal policy goals, as indicated by 
congressional pronouncements.83 The current federal policy with respect to 
tribal nations is to promote self-sufficiency and self-determination, so 
ambiguous statutory language should be read in a way to facilitate those 
goals.84 This canon cuts against application of general statutes to tribal 
nations because self-sufficiency and self-determination suggest that the 
tribal nations be governed according to their own statutes, not those of the 
federal government. On a smaller scale, the canon suggests that courts 
resolve ambiguities within a statute applicable to tribal nations in such a 
manner to promote tribal self-sufficiency and self-determination. 
The Supreme Court’s repeated endorsement of these canons of 
statutory construction would suggest they are the preferred approach to the 
issue of applicability of federal legislation to tribal nations; especially so 
since the Court has yet to endorse the Tuscarora presumption as applied in 
circuit courts.85 Whatever the reasons for the Court’s silence regarding 
Tuscarora, it has created some doctrinal confusion for lower courts, which 
are unsure whether to apply Tuscarora or the Court-endorsed canons of 
statutory construction. And this choice is important: Tuscarora cuts against 
tribal autonomy, while the canons of statutory construction promote it. 
Amidst this doctrinal confusion, it is not surprising that circuit courts 
disagreed as to whether ERISA properly applies to tribal nations—at least 
until the 2006 amendment clarified Congress’s intent.86 
 
81 E.g., Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985). 
82 See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2324–26 (2011) (discussing 
various conceptions of the trust responsibilities including holding land in trust and fiduciary duties). 
83 See, e.g., Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 275–76 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing interpreting ambiguities in light of congressional policy). 
84 See, e.g., Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 
1183 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The broad interpretation of tribal sovereign 
immunity can trace its origins to Congress’ desire to promote the goal of Indian self-government, 
including its overriding goal of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development . . . .”). 
85 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999) 
(“Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its intent to do so.”); Yakima 
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 269 (majority opinion) (stating that the canon to construe ambiguities in 
favor of tribes to be “a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian jurisprudence”); Oneida Indian 
Nation, 470 U.S. at 247 (“[I]t is well established that treaties should be construed liberally in favor of 
the Indians . . . .”). 
86 Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 906(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1051–52 (2006) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)). 
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III. ERISA’S APPLICABILITY TO TRIBAL NATIONS 
After ERISA’s enactment in 1974, there was some confusion among 
pension plan administrators and courts alike concerning ERISA’s 
applicability to tribal nations. As a general matter, whether a federal law is 
applicable in tribal nations depends mainly on the evinced intent of 
Congress.87 Because ERISA was silent as to its applicability to tribal 
nations, the competing case lines discussed supra came to different 
conclusions. Prior to 2006, both the Seventh88 and Ninth89 Circuits applied 
the Tuscarora rule in holding that ERISA was applicable in tribal nations, 
whereas a court in the Eastern District of Washington found that tribal 
nations were included in one of ERISA’s exceptions and therefore ERISA 
did not apply on tribal reservations.90 In amending ERISA, the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 clarified Congress’s intent to make ERISA 
applicable to tribal nations by explicitly excluding tribal governmental 
plans from ERISA’s ambit.91 This Part briefly surveys the ERISA 
landscape before and after the amendment. 
Prior to the Pension Protection Act of 2006, the Ninth and Seventh 
Circuits started with the Tuscarora presumption that Congress intended to 
make ERISA applicable in tribal nations and analyzed ERISA’s regulatory 
target to determine if any of the Coeur d’Alene exceptions applied. In 
Lumber Industry v. Warm Springs,92 the Warm Springs Indian Reservation 
passed an ordinance requiring every tribal business enterprise to offer the 
same level of benefits and plan flexibility to tribal members as those 
members would receive under the tribal plan.93 The tribal lumber mill 
stopped making payments to the multi-employer pension plan, as that plan 
did not meet the ordinance’s requirements.94 The pension plan sued and lost 
in the district court.95 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit primarily focused on the first Tuscarora 
exception: whether “the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in 
purely intramural matters.”96 The court seemed to narrow the exception, 
 
87 See, e.g., Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 202 (holding that Congress must 
evince clear intent to abrogate treaty rights); Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 259 (holding that 
Congress in the Burke Act made clear its intent to permit a state to tax Native American land). 
88 Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932–36 (7th Cir. 1989). 
89 Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683, 685–86 (9th 
Cir. 1991). 
90 Colville Confederated Tribes v. Somday, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130–35 (E.D. Wash. 2000). 
91 120 Stat. at 1051–52 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)). 
92 939 F.2d 683. 
93 Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 730 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. 
Cal. 1990), rev’d, 939 F.2d 683. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 329. 
96 Lumber Indus. Pension Fund, 939 F.2d at 685 (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 
751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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determining that applying ERISA on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation 
would not “usurp the tribe’s decision-making power,”97 nor impinge upon 
tribal self-government because it did “not encroach on the tribe’s right of 
self-governance in passing or enforcing”98 the ordinance’s requirements. 
That is, the court thought that ERISA’s funding requirements were a 
separate issue that did not impinge upon the tribe’s ability to enact 
minimum pension plan benefit requirements. The court then summarily 
rejected the remaining two exceptions as inapplicable.99 
In Smart v. State Farm Insurance Co.,100 decided in 1989, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld ERISA’s application to tribal nations, writing, “[a] statute of 
general application will not be applied to an Indian Tribe when the statute 
threatens the Tribe’s ability to govern its intramural affairs, but not simply 
whenever it merely affects self-governance as broadly conceived.”101 It 
concluded that applying ERISA did not affect any positive treaty rights and 
that it could not find any evidence of congressional intent to exclude tribal 
nations from the reach of the statute.102 
In 2006, Congress passed the Pension Protection Act, which 
substantially amended ERISA. This amendment added to ERISA’s 
“governmental plan” definition, discussed supra, explicitly exempting 
tribal government pension plans for individuals performing essential 
government functions.103 This language served two functions. First, it 
exempted certain tribal governmental plans from the reach of ERISA. More 
importantly, however, it clarified that Congress originally intended ERISA 
to apply to tribal nations.104 If ERISA did not apply to them, there would be 
no reason to amend the statute to include the tribal government exception: 
such tribal government pension plans would already have been excluded. 
This comports with expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the canon of 
statutory construction stating that “to express or include one thing implies 
the exclusion of the other.”105 Furthermore, if Congress had intended to 
prohibit wholesale ERISA’s application in tribal territory, it likely would 
have made a straightforward statement to that effect, rather than leaving 




99 Id. at 685–86. 
100 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989). 
101 Id. at 935. 
102 Id. at 936. 
103 Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 906(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1051 (2006) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)). 
104 Crawford, supra note 9, at 279. 
105 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (9th ed. 2009). 
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To summarize: ERISA appears to generally apply in tribal nations.106 
By ERISA’s plain language, it applies to all private employers operating 
within tribal nations and offering pension plans, whether or not they 
employ tribal members.107 By the Pension Plan Act’s plain language, when 
the tribal government or subdivision thereof is the employer, ERISA 
applies if not all of its employees are predominantly performing essential 
government functions.108 And because Congress has plenary power to 
regulate interstate commerce within the nation’s borders, ERISA governs 
the pension plans of tribal members working in the United States, outside 
the tribal nation.109 Because ERISA will be widely in force in tribal nations, 
it is important to determine the extent to which tribal courts can participate 
in the important judicial tasks ERISA requires, including issuing marital-
asset division orders. 
IV. ANALYSIS: WILL ERISA ADMINISTRATORS ACCEPT  
TRIBAL COURT DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS? 
The relationship between ERISA and tribal nations raises important 
questions regarding the ability of tribal courts to serve as the judicial 
mediator required by ERISA. In divorce and child support contexts, ERISA 
predicates a plan administrator’s action on the administrator receiving an 
order “made pursuant to a State domestic relations law.”110 While this 
seems to be a simple phrase, it raises important issues for tribal 
sovereignty. Given that a particular set of code is considered state law, it is 
unclear whether a particular judicial identity necessarily inheres within that 
code. That is, does substantive state law, when applied by an entity not 
endowed with the power to interpret that law, retain its identity as state 
law? Or are state courts the sole exercisers of state law? 
The DOL concluded in an Advisory Opinion that, according to the 
definitions in ERISA (as discussed infra), a tribal court is not a state court, 
so tribal court orders are not made pursuant to state law, unless the state has 
a statute recognizing tribal court orders as being made pursuant to state 
law.111 Based on this Advisory Opinion, the DOL directed plan 
administrators to not honor the tribal court marital-asset division orders.112 
But this conclusion ignored a more plausible interpretation of the ERISA 
provisions: if a tribal court has available in tribal code a choice of law 
provision allowing the application of state law, and were to import that 
state law to divide the marital assets, then the action would have been taken 
 
106 See Crawford, supra note 9, at 279. 
107 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2006). 
108 See Crawford, supra note 9, at 278–79. 
109 § 1003(a)(1)–(3). 
110 Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 
111 Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *2–3. 
112 Id. at *3. 
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pursuant to state law as required by ERISA. In that instance, plan 
administrators should treat the tribal court order just as they would an order 
coming from a state court. Of course, if the tribal nation does not have a 
choice of law provision to utilize issuing the division order, then plan 
administrators would be more hard-pressed to accept it, and judicial 
clarification should be sought. 
A. The United States DOL Advisory Opinion 
Recently, PNM Resources, an extensive energy holding company 
based in Albuquerque, New Mexico,113 requested an advisory opinion from 
the United States DOL, inquiring whether ERISA benefit plan 
administrators can honor tribal court domestic relations orders for purposes 
of ERISA.114 PNM Resources employs approximately 2000 people,115 many 
of whom are members of the twenty-two Native American tribes found in 
New Mexico.116 Because these tribal members often live in tribal nations 
and have access to tribal courts, PNM received draft domestic relations 
orders issued by tribal courts.117 PNM, as a corporation that must comply 
with ERISA in offering its employee pension benefit plans, sought 
guidance from the DOL as to whether it could accept tribal court orders 
issued by the Family Court of the Navajo Nation.118 
The DOL’s analysis is easily summarized. To begin, the DOL noted 
that pension plan benefits generally cannot be assigned or alienated.119 
However, there are exceptions to this general rule, including assignments 
pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order.120 Pension plan providers 
must comply with the terms of such an order.121 
Continuing its analysis, the DOL noted that a qualified domestic 
relations order is defined in ERISA as a domestic relations order “which 
creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right to, or 
assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the 
 
113 Corporate Overview, PNM RESOURCES, http://www.pnmresources.com/corporate/corp
Overview.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
114 Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *1. 
115 PNM Resources Inc., WALL ST. J., http://quotes.wsj.com/PNM/company-people (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2014). 
116 Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *1. As of 2003, approximately four 
percent of the then-2600 employees were Native American. News Release, PNM Resources, PNM 
Once Again Named One of Best U.S. Companies for Minority Employees (July 2, 2003) (on file with 
the Northwestern University Law Review). 
117 Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *1. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. (referring to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
§ 206(d)(1), 88 Stat. 829, 864 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1056)). 
120 § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2006). 
121 See id. 
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benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan.”122 A “domestic 
relations order,” in turn, is 
any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement 
agreement) which—(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony 
payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other 
dependent of a participant, and (II) is made pursuant to a State domestic 
relations law (including a community property law).123 
Following the chain of definitions one link further, “State,” as noted 
supra, is defined as “any State of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake 
Island, and the Canal Zone.”124 Notably, this definition does not include 
tribal nations. 
A pension plan administrator, upon receiving a domestic relations 
order, must determine whether it is “qualified” pursuant to a State domestic 
relations law.125 Up to this point in the analysis, the Advisory Opinion 
simply linked the various relevant definitions contained in ERISA. 
However, the Opinion went on to append an additional requirement, one 
that the DOL explicitly admitted is not found in the statute. It stated that the 
qualified domestic relations order made pursuant to state law must be 
issued “by a State authority with jurisdiction over such matters.”126 The 
DOL justified adding the above clause by reasoning: 
A principal purpose of ERISA section 206(d)(3) is to permit the division of 
marital property on divorce in accordance with the directions of the State 
authority with jurisdiction to achieve an appropriate disposition of property 
upon the dissolution of a marriage, as defined under State law. Nothing in 
ERISA section 206(d)(3) requires that a domestic relations order be issued by 
a State court. Rather, the Department has previously concluded that a division 
of marital property in accordance with the proper final order of any State 
authority recognized within the State’s jurisdiction as being empowered to 
achieve such a division of property pursuant to State domestic relations law 
(including community property law) would be considered a “judgment, 
decree, or order” for purposes of ERISA section 206(d)(3)(B)(ii).127 
Thus, while explicitly noting that ERISA does not require that a 
domestic relations order be issued by a state court, it in effect appended 
such a requirement because nothing in the Advisory Opinion’s language 
actually precludes other sources from being considered a “judgment, 
decree, or order.” 
 
122 Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *1 (quoting § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)). 
123 Id. (quoting § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)). 
124 Id. at *2 (quoting § 1002(10)). 
125 Id. (citing § 1056(d)(3)(G)). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Finally, the DOL noted that certain states have laws addressing 
jurisdictional issues with respect to tribal court domestic relations orders.128 
For example, an Oregon statute provides, “[a] foreign judgment of a tribal 
court . . . filed in a circuit court . . . that . . . [is] a domestic relations order 
as defined in 26 U.S.C. 414(p), is a domestic relations order made pursuant 
to the domestic relations laws of this state for the purposes of 
26 U.S.C. 414(p).”129 In accordance with the DOL’s defining clause, it 
reasoned that in states such as Oregon, the tribal courts’ domestic relations 
orders would constitute a qualified domestic relations order for purposes of 
ERISA, because the state had endorsed the tribal court’s jurisdiction.130 
Because New Mexico did not have such a law, the DOL concluded by 
stating that it could not conclude that a domestic relations order from the 
Family Court of the Navajo Nation would be a domestic relations order that 
pension plan administrators could honor under ERISA.131 
DOL advisory opinions purport to only evaluate the facts to which 
they respond.132 Such opinions are not binding on courts, although they may 
be persuasive to the extent that their reasoning is persuasive.133 But the 
DOL’s reasoning is not persuasive. This opinion improperly restricted the 
source of qualified domestic relations orders, and in so doing, stripped 
tribal courts of the power to adjudicate claims for their own members. 
While the issue has yet to be heard in state or federal court, once it is, for 
the reasons discussed infra the reasoning should be refuted. 
B. Weaknesses in the Advisory Opinion 
The main problem with the Advisory Opinion is its addition of the 
phrase “by a State authority with jurisdiction over such matters.” At first 
glance, it may seem like this phrase is an innocuous redundancy that does 
not change anything substantive at all, but rather states the obvious: for a 
domestic relations order to be valid, it must be issued by a court with the 
power to do so. Intuitively, it does not seem controversial to say that a 
domestic relations order drawn up by an aspiring amateur attorney would 
not qualify as a valid domestic relations order, no matter how closely and 
accurately the attorney followed the state law regarding domestic relations. 
An examination of the language of ERISA confirms this: section 
206(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) defines “qualified domestic relations order” as a 
domestic relations order “which creates or recognizes the existence of an 
 
128 Id. 
129 OR. REV. STAT. § 24.115(4) (2011). 
130 Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *2. 
131 Id. at *3. 
132 Advisory Opinions, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/AOs/main.html (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
133 Alexander v. Brigham & Women’s Physicians Org., Inc., 513 F.3d 37, 47 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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alternate payee’s right to . . . receive . . . benefits.”134 Thus, ERISA says 
that one of the requirements for a domestic relations order to be qualified is 
that it must create or recognize a right. The term “right” implies that there 
must be a legal consequence somewhere to the creation of the domestic 
relations order,135 but the statute does not go so far as to specify where 
exactly that right must be created. 
But the phrase added to the Advisory Opinion does more than simply 
prohibit the backroom, amateur attorney from making a living selling 
qualified domestic relations orders; it prohibits tribal courts from doing so. 
In this way it is worse than redundant: it is overly restrictive because courts 
that should have authority to issue qualified domestic relations orders under 
the plain language of ERISA are precluded from exercising it. It is a 
plausible, natural reading of the statute that any court with proper 
jurisdiction over the individuals seeking the domestic relations order may 
draw up such an order, pursuant to state law.136 
What then is the purpose of the word “recognize” in ERISA? Canons 
of statutory interpretation instruct that words should not be construed such 
that their inclusion is superfluous.137 The Advisory Opinion opined that a 
state must have a statute that explicitly recognizes the validity of tribal 
domestic relations orders, thereby bringing them under state law, before 
ERISA plan administrators can recognize them. This interpretation follows 
this canon of construction, but it is not the only possibility. It seems at least 
equally likely that “recognize” was included to allow state laws to 
acknowledge the validity of domestic relations orders created pursuant to 
tribal domestic relations law,138 or another jurisdiction’s native body of law 
(e.g., another state’s law). That is, it imparts to the states the discretion to 
recognize a tribal-judiciary-created right as state law that otherwise would 
not be state law. Furthermore, this reading of “recognize” avoids the 
unnecessarily constrained reading of “create” that the Advisory Opinion 
advocates, making it the better interpretation.139 
C. What Does It Mean to Be Made Pursuant to State Law? 
Even granting that a tribal court may, in some instances, be an 
appropriate adjudicatory body, ERISA still requires that a “domestic 
 
134 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
135 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 1436. 
136 “[A]ny judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement agreement) 
which . . . is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community property law).” 
§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
137 E.g., Raven Red Ash Coal Corp. v. Absher, 149 S.E. 541, 542 (Va. 1929) (“Every part of an act 
is presumed to be of some effect, and is not to be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary.”). 
138 Such as the Oregon statute discussed supra at note 129. 
139 The Opinion constrains “create” by interpreting it to require creation by a particular 
adjudicatory body. 
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relations order” be “made pursuant to a State domestic relations law.”140 
The Advisory Opinion correctly asserts that the ERISA definition of 
“State” does not include tribal nations.141 It follows that a domestic 
relations order created under a tribal nation’s domestic relations law142 
would not qualify under ERISA, and would therefore force tribal members 
into state court, unless the state explicitly authorizes the contrary. (For 
policy reasons, plan administrators should be allowed to recognize 
domestic relations orders issued by tribal courts as “qualified” under 
ERISA, but this situation will be discussed infra more thoroughly.) 
However, many tribal nations’ codes have a choice of law provision 
allowing tribal courts to employ state law, as opposed to tribal law, in 
appropriate circumstances.143 In such instances, the plain language of 
ERISA is satisfied because ERISA only requires that the domestic relations 
order be “made pursuant to a State domestic relations law.”144 Thus, when a 
tribal court uses state law, the resulting decision is pursuant to state law as 
required by ERISA, so ERISA plan administrators should accept these 
orders. 
A counterargument is that a tribal judicial system’s use of state law via 
a choice of law provision is arguably an incorporation of state law into 
tribal domestic laws; the law resulting from invoking a choice of law 
provision to use state law in effect yields tribal law that mimics the 
substance of state law without actually borrowing its identity.145 Under this 
reasoning, it could be said that the result of a tribal court’s application of 
state law is not a result “pursuant to state law” because the state law ceased 
to be state law upon incorporation into the tribal judicial system. But this is 
contrary to the normal understanding of choice of law provisions.146 Federal 
courts sitting in diversity are not said to be applying federal law; they are 
choosing which state law to apply.147 Furthermore, state courts often apply 
the laws of other states where substantial portions of the alleged violations 
 
140 § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 
141 Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *2. 
142 For example, NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 407 (2005) requires a divorce decree issued 
by a tribal court to end a customary marriage. 
143 For example, NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 204, discussed infra in Part IV.D, allows for 
the importation of federal law when applicable, and state law when Navajo and federal law are silent on 
the issue. 
144 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (2006). 
145 See, e.g., In re Commitment of Lawrence Lee Jr., CA 99-03, at *4 (Rbd. Sx. Tr. Sup. Ct. July 
12, 2000) (per curiam), available at http://sicanguoyatebar.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/In-re-
Commitment-of-Lawrence-Lee-Jr.-CA-99-031.pdf (“However, when the trial court applied ‘state’ law 
principles in the past to matters of ‘mental commitment’, those state precepts of law became tribal 
law.”). 
146 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that a federal court sitting in 
diversity actions must apply the law of the state, as “[t]here is no federal general common law”). 
147 See id. 
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occurred.148 With the understanding that a choice of law provision allows a 
jurisdiction to apply the laws of another jurisdiction, the issue becomes 
whether a specific statute allows it. 
Furthermore, even given that a choice of law provision provides 
results pursuant to the loaner state’s laws, there is still the argument that the 
tribal court is applying tribal law (by rebranding state law as tribal law), not 
state law. But this is of no consequence. According to Black’s Law 
Dictionary, “pursuant to” means “[i]n compliance with” or “in accordance 
with.”149 The exact identity of the law is less important than is the content 
of the law. If the process of decisionmaking and the results of the decision 
are the same as they would be in a state court applying state law, then it can 
be said that the tribal court’s decision is pursuant to state law. 
D. Choice of Law in the Navajo Nation 
Tribal courts may or may not have a choice of law provision available 
to them. The form varies among those that do. The Navajo Nation is one of 
the largest tribal nations in the United States,150 and its choice of law 
provision makes for an interesting study because of its complexity. The 
Navajo Nation Code151 choice of law provision states: 
A. In all cases the courts of the Navajo Nation shall first apply applicable 
Navajo Nation statutory laws and regulations to resolve matters in 
dispute before the courts. The Courts shall utilize Diné bi 
beenahaz’áanii (Navajo Traditional, Customary, Natural or Common 
Law) to guide the interpretation of Navajo Nation statutory laws and 
regulations. The courts shall also utilize Diné bi beenahaz’áanii 
whenever Navajo Nation statutes or regulations are silent on matters 
in dispute before the courts. 
B. To determine the appropriate utilization and interpretation of Diné bi 
beenahaz’áanii, the court shall request, as it deems necessary, advice 
from Navajo individuals widely recognized as being knowledgeable 
about Diné bi beenahaz’áanii. 
C. The courts of the Navajo Nation shall apply federal laws or 
regulations as may be applicable. 
D. Any matters not addressed by Navajo Nation statutory laws and 
regulations, Diné bi beenahaz’áanii or by applicable federal laws and 
 
148 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1981) 
(discussing the application of Illinois law in Florida state courts). 
149 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 1356. 
150 Cindy Yurth, Census: Native Count Jumps by 27 Percent, NAVAJO TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, 
available at http://navajotimes.com/news/2012/0112/012612census.php; see Bill Donovan, Census: 
Navajo Enrollment Tops 300,000, NAVAJO TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A1, available at http://navajotimes.
com/news/2011/0711/070711census.php. 
151 The Navajo Nation Code is analogous to federal statutory law. See MacArthur v. San Juan 
Cnty., 391 F. Supp. 2d 895, 965 (D. Utah 2005). 
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regulations, may be decided according to comity with reference to the 
laws of the state in which the matter in dispute may have arisen.152 
This choice of law provision is similar to those of other tribal nations 
that direct the court to apply the first applicable code provision found from 
a list of potentially applicable bodies of law, ordered in descending 
preference.153 A Navajo Nation tribal court must first apply Navajo Nation 
statutory law, supplemented with Navajo common law, then any applicable 
federal law, and finally must reference state laws only if it finds the former 
sources lacking. 
The relevant question for purposes of ERISA is whether the Navajo 
Nation choice of law provision allows tribal courts to issue domestic 
relations orders pursuant to state law. The answer is unclear and probably 
depends on the tribal court and the framing of the issue. On the one hand, 
Navajo Nation common law governs the division of assets upon the 
dissolution of a marriage.154 If this is the case, then the Navajo court would 
not be allowed to invoke the fourth provision and decide the case in comity 
with state laws. Because the order would be based on tribal law, ERISA’s 
mandate that the domestic relations order be pursuant to state law would 
not be met, and tribal members would be forced into state court to divide 
marital assets. 
However, a creative and willing tribal court could utilize one of two 
ways in which its decision could be made pursuant to state law and 
therefore satisfy ERISA. The first way is with respect to the Navajo Nation 
common law. Common law is judge-made law. Thus, the court could 
exercise its common-law-making power and find that the Navajo Nation 
common law, for cases in which the tribal members will be forced to 
adjudicate their claims in a foreign court if the Navajo court order does not 
comply with ERISA, dictates that the court use state substantive law. Such 
an order would then be pursuant to state law and the plain language of 
ERISA would be satisfied. 
A second approach would require reframing the issue. Because the 
Navajo Nation Code mandates referencing state law when Navajo Nation 
law does not speak to the issue,155 the court could frame the issue not 
simply as a division of marital assets, but more specifically as the division 
of marital assets for pension benefit plans governed by ERISA. The Navajo 
Nation has neither statutory provisions nor common law doctrine that 
 
152 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 204 (2005). 
153 See, e.g., LUMNI NATION CODE tit. 4, § 4.07.010 (2008); SAC AND FOX NATION CODE tit. 9, § 8 
(1985). 
154 RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL 
SELF-GOVERNANCE 179–80 (2009). For a discussion of related topics and court cases, see id. 
155 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit 7, § 204 (2005). 
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would thus be applicable,156 and the court could reference state law, issue 
an order pursuant to it, and again, meet ERISA’s plain-language demands. 
Were a Navajo court to employ either of these approaches, the result would 
both comply with the directives of the Navajo Nation choice of law 
provision and produce a result in accordance with the plain language of 
ERISA. 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Relevant policy considerations also suggest that tribal nations be 
allowed to issue qualified domestic relations orders that can be honored by 
ERISA administrators. Even when tribal nations lack a choice of law 
provision and therefore do not have the capability to apply state law, tribal 
courts should still be able to issue domestic relations orders that will be 
honored by ERISA administrators, because so allowing increases tribal 
autonomy and continues the tribal courts’ role of safeguarding tribal 
customs and understandings, instead of subordinating them to the ideas of 
the mainstream American culture and jurisprudence. 
A. Increasing Tribal Autonomy 
Increasing tribal autonomy is an oft-repeated goal of federal policy.157 
This goal is exemplified by, among other things, allowing tribal gaming 
ventures.158 These gaming ventures required many employees,159 which led 
to competition for employees,160 which likely contributed to these tribal 
gaming ventures offering employee benefit plans, including pension 
plans.161 The proliferation of these pension plans was a significant factor 
contributing to ERISA’s widespread application across tribal nations, 
which is—the views of certain courts notwithstanding162—arguably an 
 
156 See NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. A search for “ERISA” in Navajo court cases reveals no 
relevant authority. Tribal Court Decisions Search Results, PICO SEARCH, http://www.picosearch.com/
cgi-bin/ts.pl?index=130686;query=erisa;SEARCH=Search;opt=ANY (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
157 See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (noting that 
an inquiry into the applicability of state bingo regulation is colored by the policy of tribal autonomy); 
Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1182–83 (10th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity was an important part of tribal self-determination). 
158 See Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d at 1183; William Buffalo & Kevin J. 
Wadzinski, Application of Federal and State Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal Employers, 
25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1995). 
159 See Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 158. 
160 See Burge, supra note 51, at 1292 n.5 (giving the example of the Potawatomi Bingo Casino 
using pension plans to recruit employees). 
161 Id. at 1291–92 & n.5. 
162 See Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683, 685 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (following Tuscarora in finding ERISA applicable to a tribally owned sawmill); see also 
Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932–36 (7th Cir. 1989) (following Tuscarora in finding 
ERISA applicable to tribal health center employees). 
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infringement on the autonomy and sovereignty of these tribes. Nonetheless, 
ERISA’s current application to tribal nations is fairly established law 
because of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 amendments to ERISA.163 
But ERISA’s regulation of private entities within tribal nations does not 
render moot the federal policy of increasing tribal autonomy, nor the 
canons of statutory construction repeatedly expounded upon by the 
Supreme Court.164 And so the focus of interpretation moves from the macro 
to the micro: from the issue of wholesale applicability to how best to 
interpret specific provisions of ERISA. 
The main problem with not allowing ERISA administrators to honor 
tribal courts’ domestic relations orders is that it reduces tribal autonomy. 
Tribal courts are not allowed to interface with a statute that affects many of 
their tribal members. A tribal member seeking marital-asset division upon 
divorce is then forced to go to a state court to obtain a domestic relations 
order that an employer will honor. This presents both jurisdictional and 
practical problems, both of which function to reduce the role of tribal 
courts in shaping the domestic relations of their own tribal members, and, 
in so doing, reduces tribal autonomy. 
At a general level, different jurisdictional conditions exist between 
tribal nations and their host states. In some instances there will be 
concurrent jurisdiction, in which case the state court of the state of the 
tribal nation has jurisdiction over disputes between Native Americans about 
events arising or occurring solely in tribal nations.165 This will not create 
jurisdictional difficulties for tribal members seeking division of pension 
plans issued by tribe-owned corporations, although it still creates practical 
problems. In other instances, however, the tribal court will have exclusive 
jurisdiction.166 This means that the tribal member will not be able to obtain 
a state court domestic relations order; instead, she will be forced to obtain a 
tribal court domestic relations order and hope to have it recognized by the 
ERISA plan administrator. 
In the first scenario, the tribal member is incentivized to forego tribal 
court for state court to ensure that the plan administrator will recognize the 
court’s order as “qualified” under ERISA. To the extent that tribal 
members seek redress in state court, this approach decreases utilization of 
tribal courts, concomitantly reduces tribal court influence over tribal 
members and tribal policy, and thereby reduces tribal autonomy as a whole. 
In the second instance, the tribal member must find a state court that is 
 
163 See Crawford, supra note 9, at 279. 
164 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the canons of construction). 
165 See Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public 
Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1632–35 (1998). 
166 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (“There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of 
state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs . . . .”). 
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willing and able to certify a domestic relations order from the tribal court,167 
which would allow the ERISA administrator to honor it. This creates a 
subservient relationship between the two entities, and raises questions 
about the type of review the state court will perform. 
Practically speaking, not allowing tribal members to utilize tribal 
courts to obtain domestic relations orders for purposes of complying with 
ERISA means that tribal members are forced to travel to courts to which 
they may have no substantial connection (other than that the court happens 
to be in the same state as the reservation) and which may be farther from 
where they live than their tribal court.168 This makes it unnecessarily 
difficult to obtain a domestic relations order that will be honored by ERISA 
administrators. Certainly, tribal members who work for private employers 
outside of tribal nations can expect to be somewhat accountable for their 
activities to the local government of that jurisdiction. However, it seems 
grossly unfair to say that, by virtue of working outside the reservation, they 
have consented to adjudicating in state court the division of the property 
they hold within the tribal nation. Yet this is what the DOL’s current 
reading of ERISA mandates. And while it may be said that by participating 
in a nontribal pension plan, the tribal member has been given notice of and 
consented to state court jurisdiction over marital-asset division, this misses 
the point—that tribal members should not be required to seek redress in 
state court and that tribal courts should not be stripped of their power to 
adjudicate the domestic relations of their own tribal members. 
B. Cultural and Historical Expertise 
Tribal nations have histories separate from the United States and each 
other. They have different creation myths,169 different ways of structuring 
domestic relations,170 different values,171 and different understandings of the 
 
167 “Able” meaning the state legislature has endowed the state court to certify tribal court orders. 
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 24.115(4) (2011) (“A foreign judgment of a tribal court of a federally 
recognized Indian tribe that is filed in a circuit court under this section, and that otherwise complies 
with 26 U.S.C. 414(p) as a domestic relations order as defined in 26 U.S.C. 414(p), is a domestic 
relations order made pursuant to the domestic relations laws of this state for the purposes of 26 U.S.C. 
414(p).”). 
168 See AZ Courts Locator, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.azcourts.gov/AZCourts/AZCourts
Locator.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). For a map of the Navajo Nation judicial districts, see 
Interactive Map of the Judicial District Courts of the Navajo Nation, JUD. BRANCH NAVAJO NATION, 
http://www.navajocourts.org/indexdistct.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2014). 
169 See Harold Carey Jr., Navajo Creation Story—The First World “Nihodilhil” (Black World), 
NAVAJO PEOPLE CULTURE & HIST. (Mar. 12, 2011), http://navajopeople.org/blog/navajo-creation-story-
the-first-world-nihodilhil-black-world/. 
170 See Diné Marriage Act of 2005, CAP-29-05 (Apr. 22, 2005), available at http://www.navajo
courts.org/Resolutions/29-05%20Marriage%20Act.pdf (amending Navajo Nation Code title 9 to 
prohibit same sex marriage). 
171 See Wisdom of the Elders, NAVAJOVALUES.COM, http://www.navajovalues.com/NataniValues/
natani/wisdomofelders.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
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world.172 These differences create unique obligations among individuals 
and varied methods for resolving situations in which these obligations are 
not met. Tribal courts are uniquely endowed with the cultural and historical 
understanding necessary to resolve these disputes.173 Forcing state courts to 
adjudicate according to customs with which they are not familiar is at best 
irresponsible,174 and at worst perpetuates the cultural imperialism and 
vanishing of Native American traditions that have been ongoing for the last 
five hundred years.175 State courts should not issue domestic orders for tribe 
members whose cultural norms are unique to Native American history, and 
ERISA administrators must be allowed to recognize tribal orders to permit 
tribal traditions to continue. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Something needs to change so that tribal courts can issue domestic 
relations orders that will be honored by ERISA administrators. Whether 
this is accomplished by altering the language of ERISA to include tribal 
courts in the definition of entities authorized to issue “qualified” orders or 
by judicial interpretation, what is paramount is for tribal nations to enjoy 
autonomy in organizing their domestic relations. This Part offers specific 
changes that can be made so that tribal courts are able to participate in and 
shape the domestic relations of their nations while also protecting the 
cultural norms of the people they govern.176 
A. Potential Legislative Changes 
First, Congress could amend the definitions in ERISA. This can be 
done in one of two ways. Congress could simply change the definition of 
“domestic relations order” in § 206(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) from “is made pursuant 
to a State domestic relations law (including a community property law)”177 
to “is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a 
community property law or a tribal nation domestic relations law).” This 
 
172 See Navajo Cultural History and Legends, NAVAJOVALUES.COM, http://www.navajovalues.
com/natani/navajovalues.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
173 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978) (“[I]ssues likely to arise in a civil 
context . . . will frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may 
be in a better position to evaluate than federal courts.”). A similar argument may be made for having 
separate courts for the various immigrant groups residing in the United States. However, such a 
situation is different from the concerns of federal and state adjudication of tribal relations because the 
latter implicates sovereignty concerns. 
174 For a discussion of Navajo marital-asset division, see AUSTIN, supra note 154. 
175 See, e.g., EUROPEAN TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS 
DEPENDENCIES TO 1648, at 95–100 (Frances Gardiner Davenport ed., 1917) (explaining how the 
Portuguese and Spanish divided the non-European world via the Treaty of Tordesillas, with the blessing 
of the Pope, in 1494, thereby devaluing indigenous cultures). 
176 For a discussion regarding tribal courts shaping domestic relations, see AUSTIN, supra note 154. 
177 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (2006). 
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would explicitly allow tribal nations to apply their own native laws to the 
division of marital assets, including pension plans.178 
Alternatively, Congress could modify the definition of “state” to 
include tribal nations.179 However, this may require a rewording of the 
definition of “governmental plan” that the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
amended.180 Were “state” redefined to include tribal nations, the current 
wording of “governmental plan” would exempt all pension plans of the 
tribal nation from ERISA, not solely the pension plans of individuals 
employed in pursuit of essential government services. 
Expanding the exemption might make sense, especially in light of the 
federal government’s policy goal to promote tribal autonomy. Furthermore, 
Congress’s original concern when passing ERISA was to protect workers 
in private industry from pension plan underfunding.181 But because tribal 
governments have the power to tax and to spend,182 the problem of pension 
plan underfunding is of little concern, irrespective of whether the 
governmental employee is employed in pursuit of essential governmental 
services or more traditionally commercial activities, because the tribal 
government can raise revenue by raising taxes or cutting spending, thereby 
ensuring adequate funding levels.183 This might put tribal nation enterprises 
pursuing traditionally commercial activities at an advantage compared to 
nontribal private entities, but in the one area where many tribal 
governments earn substantial revenue—tribal gaming—this concern is not 
an issue.184 Most states do not allow casinos (outside of tribal reservations), 
so there is little private party competition, in this industry at least, to 
disadvantage.185 
There are numerous examples of federal statutes that provide for the 
recognition of certain orders across jurisdictional boundaries. For one, 
protective orders are to be “accorded full faith and credit by the court of 
another State, Indian tribe, or territory . . . and enforced by the court and 
 
178 For example, Navajo common law has two ways of dividing marital assets: equally between the 
partners, or everything to the woman. AUSTIN, supra note 154, at 180. 
179 § 1002(10). 
180 Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 906(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1051 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(32)). 
181 § 1001. 
182 See, e.g., PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION CONST., art. v, § 1. 
183 Thus, the rationale behind ERISA’s governmental plan exemption should apply here as well. 
For a discussion on the rationale for this exemption, see Rose v. Long Island Railroad Pension Plan, 
828 F.2d 910, 913–15 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988). 
184 2012 Gaming Revenue Distributed by Region, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION, 
http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/media/2012%20Gaming%20Revenue%20
Distribution%20by%20Region.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
185 Only seventeen states allow stand-alone non-Indian casinos. Types of Gaming by State, AM. 
GAMING ASS’N, http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/states-gaming 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
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law enforcement personnel of the other State, Indian tribal government or 
Territory as if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.”186 It would 
not be hard to substitute “domestic relations orders” for “protection 
order”187 in an analogous statute, and it would be all that is required to 
make orders issued by tribal courts “qualified” under ERISA. 
Changes can be made on the state level as well to recognize tribal 
court domestic relations orders. As the Advisory Opinion noted,188 some 
states have laws that expressly provide for state recognition of tribal 
domestic relations orders.189 Such statutes basically incorporate the 
substance of the tribal court domestic relations order into the laws of the 
state. States not having such laws should enact them—Oregon’s statute 
described in the Advisory Opinion is a perfect model. However, such a 
strategy is by its nature somewhat cumbersome, as each state must 
individually pass such legislation. 
B. Potential Judicial Changes 
However, legislation is not the only path by which tribal courts can be 
enabled to participate in the shaping of this particular sphere of domestic 
relations within their own tribe. Changes can be made by federal and state 
courts as well.190 Federal and state courts can simply interpret “pursuant to 
a State domestic relations law”191 to require a particular body of law to be 
used to create the domestic relations order, void of any requirement for a 
specific adjudicatory body. This has the advantage of allowing courts to 
account for the policy benefits gained by allowing tribal courts to 
adjudicate the domestic relations of their members with respect to ERISA-
governed pension plans.192 Compared to the legislative route, however, this 
possibility has two disadvantages. 
First, this strategy requires the tribal nation to have a choice of law 
provision. Those that do not cannot take advantage of this language, even 
given a willing court. Therefore, tribal nations that do not have choice of 
law provisions should enact them. Doing so would give tribal courts more 
flexibility and increase their ability to serve as a convenient and familiar 
forum in which tribal members can seek redress. 
Second, while a choice of law provision opens the tribal court as a 
forum for redress for a tribal member with an ERISA-governed pension 
plan, it does not allow the tribal court to take into account the unique 
cultural norms and values embodied in its own native law. That is, the court 
 
186 18 U.S.C § 2265 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
187 Id. 
188 Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *2. 
189 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 24.115(4) (2011). 
190 See supra Part IV. 
191 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (2006). 
192 See supra Part V. 
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simply becomes a convenient forum for the tribal member without actually 
being a participant in the development and application of tribal law. The 
law applied would be state law, although there may be room at the margins 
for the tribal court to imbue the order with the tribe’s own cultural 
values.193 
Another possible judicial path would entail using the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution194 and the similarly worded 
congressional act.195 Such a route would be a bit more circuitous for a tribal 
member to navigate, because it would force the tribal member to bring a 
tribal court domestic relations order to state court to have it recognized.196 
However, it has the upside of allowing the tribal court to apply tribal law 
instead of state law to the division of the marital assets, thereby 
maintaining the autonomy of the tribal nation.197 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: “Full Faith and Credit shall be 
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof.”198 Notably lacking from this clause, however, is any 
mention of tribal nations. This does not mean that states do not have to 
afford full faith and credit to the laws of tribal nations. 
Evaluating the analogous congressional act changes the picture. Passed 
in 1804,199 the Full Faith and Credit Act is basically a statutory version of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but it includes important variations in 
language. The relevant part reads: “Such Acts, records and judicial 
proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court 
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by 
law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which 
they are taken.”200 The noteworthy addition to this statute, as compared to 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is that it includes “Territories and 
 
193 For example, if state law calls for equitable principles to be used in marital-asset division, it 
seems possible that when employed by a tribal court, those equitable principles might incorporate tribal 
notions of equality. New York, for example, uses equitable principles to divide marital assets upon 
divorce. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234 (McKinney 2010). 
194 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
195 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). 
196 See id. (providing full faith and credit in “every court within the United States,” meaning that 
orders issued by a tribal court should be recognized by state courts, but only if tribal nations are 
determined to be a “State, Territory, or Possession of the United States”). 
197 For example, Navajo common law allows for the woman to retain all assets accumulated by 
either party during marriage upon divorce, while state law generally does not allow this. AUSTIN, supra 
note 154, at 180. 
198 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
199 Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006)). The Act was 
originally passed in 1790 and the 1804 Act was a slight update. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 
122 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738). 
200 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 
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Possessions.” Thus, judicial determinations of the various U.S. territories 
and possessions enjoy judicial recognition in all other U.S. states, 
territories, and possessions. The important question becomes, then, whether 
the various tribal nations are either territories or possessions for the purpose 
of this statute. While some disagreement exists about this topic,201 there is a 
strong argument that they are one of the two.202 
Craig Smith, in his article Full Faith and Credit in Cross-
Jurisdictional Recognition of Tribal Court Decisions Revisited, argues that 
tribal nations constitute territories under the Act.203 To Smith, the important 
question is not whether Congress, at the time of passing the Act, thought 
tribal nations to be territories of the United States, but rather, had Congress 
been aware of the current status of tribal nations today, would it think of 
them as territories or possessions?204 To Smith, the response is clearly 
yes.205 He argues that because tribal nations are territories under this act, 
tribal courts are clearly entitled to have the outcome of their judicial 
proceedings honored in state courts.206 Thus, tribal members would need to 
obtain a tribal domestic relations order, which would need to be recognized 
by a state court, before potentially being honorable under ERISA.207 
Even if one accepts Smith’s argument, the Act merely states that tribal 
domestic relations orders must be given full faith and credit in state courts. 
That is, they must be enforceable in state courts. But is this the same as 
saying that they, in effect, are transformed into state law, as would be 
required under ERISA in order for pension plan administrators to honor 
them? On the one hand, it does not seem as though the tribal domestic 
relations orders are made pursuant to state law simply by virtue of being 
recognized as a valid order by a state court. Under this reading, pension 
plan administrators would not be required, or perhaps not even allowed, to 
honor the tribal court domestic relations orders. 
On the other hand, because the Full Faith and Credit Act requires that 
states and territories honor valid orders originating in other states or 
territories, it seems paradoxical to say that pension plan administrators 
cannot honor these orders but that state courts must honor them by the 
terms of the Act. Furthermore, if the state court finds that the orders are 
valid and tells the pension plan administrator to fulfill the terms of the 
 
201 See Craig Smith, Comment, Full Faith and Credit in Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition of Tribal 
Court Decisions Revisited, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2010). 
202 See generally id. (arguing that tribal nations should be thought of as territories in the context of 
the Full Faith and Credit Act). 
203 Id. at 1435. 
204 Id. at 1395. 
205 Id. at 1396. He analogizes from the unique status of Puerto Rico as explored in Cordova & 
Simonpietri Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981). See 
Smith, supra note 201, at 1426–27. 
206 See id. at 1428, 1431, 1434–35. 
207 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). 
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domestic relations order, the administrator will be put in the position of 
either complying with the state court or with ERISA, which tells the 
administrator to alienate only the assets in employee benefit plans based on 
qualified domestic relations orders made pursuant to state law. The 
uncertainty surrounding the route a divorcing tribal member must travel in 
order to get a tribal court’s asset division order fulfilled suggests that this 
method is not the ideal way to apply ERISA to Native American tribes. 
However, this convoluted path may be necessary unless Congress amends 
ERISA. 
CONCLUSION 
The application of federal statutes to tribal nations, when those statutes 
are silent on the issue, is a confused area of law in need of clarification. 
However, before clarification can be made, conceptual questions need to be 
answered. Chief among these is the exact relationship between tribal 
nations and the United States. Courts and the elected branches of 
government like to assert the independence and subordination of tribal 
nations simultaneously.208 The time has come for such fictions and 
sweeping generalizations209 to be set aside in favor of theoretical clarity. In 
determining whether ERISA applies to tribal nations, courts have come to 
agree that congressional intent, not prior treaties or vague platitudes about 
sovereignty, is paramount. And because Congress’s evinced intent was that 
ERISA should apply to tribal nations, it has been applied in this manner. 
Slowly, tribal nations are becoming yet another subfederal government.210 
By writing into law that qualified domestic relations orders must be 
made pursuant to state law, Congress infringed upon tribal court autonomy, 
placed state courts in the unenviable position of applying their own values 
and cultural background to people who do not share them, and forced tribal 
members to subject themselves yet again to the will of a foreign sovereign. 
There are various fixes to this problem—some simple, some 
convoluted. The simplest fix would be for Congress to amend the definition 
of domestic relations orders in ERISA so that they can be made pursuant to 
either tribal law or state law. 
However, in the absence of congressional action, there are more 
convoluted workarounds. For tribal nations that have a choice of law 
provision, the tribal courts should invoke this provision and utilize state 
law to draw up their domestic relations orders. Courts should recognize that 
these orders were drawn up pursuant to state law (and the DOL should 
revise its Opinion to acknowledge this as well) as the ERISA language 
 
208 See, e.g., Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985). 
209 See id. 
210 See id. (noting that “Indian tribes possess only a limited sovereignty that is subject to complete 
defeasance”). 
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mandates and allow employee benefit plan administrators to honor them. 
Tribal nations that do not have choice of law provisions should enact them. 
While the tribal courts will not be able to apply their own laws, they at least 
will be able to provide their members with a convenient and familiar forum 
in which to adjudicate their claims. 
States should pass laws recognizing tribal orders, not just as 
enforceable under state law, but specifically as part of state law. This will 
allow pension plan administrators to honor these tribal court orders. It will 
also permit the tribal courts both to be convenient fora for their members 
and to apply substantive tribal law. 
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